

International Conference

“Exchange of Experiences on the role of scientific  
research in the Advocacy of Public Policies”

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# **Improving Japanese ODA based on Scientific Research**

- Cases of Pesticide Assistance and  
ProSAVANA in Mozambique-  
*beyond KAIZEN*

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No! to Landgrab, Japan

# ***Objective of this presentation***

## **1. This presentation aims:**

- to share past and on-going advocacy experiences of **the Japanese civil society concerning Japan's ODA** (*Official Development Assistance*)
- **in partnership with Mozambican civil society**
- for policy change based on scientific research

## **2. The cases to be introduced are:**

- **Pesticide Assistance (1984-2004) under 2KR/KRII**
  - Japan's bilateral assistance
- **ProSAVANA (2009-to present)**
  - Japan, Brazil and Mozambique's Triangular Cooperation for Agriculture Development of Tropical Savannah in Mozambique

# ***Contents***

- 1. Context**
- 2. Experiences and Outcomes**
  - I. Case of Pesticide Assistance**
  - II. Case of ProSAVANA**
- 3. Learnt Lessons**
- 4. Proposal for acting on advocacy towards the political leaderships**

Note: AFRICA in this presentation means Sub-Sahara Africa.

# ***Context – Why important to bring these cases to this conference?***

1. Changing nature of Japanese ODA to Africa
  - i. Historically low attention and engagement to/w Africa
    - Only 16% of the entire net disbursement to Africa in FY2012
  - ii. PM Abe's visit to Africa in 2014
2. **Mozambique plays/will play the central part of this change**
  - I. PM Abe's pledge for "Nacala Development Corridor"
    - 670 million USD in 5 years
  - II. ODA for advancement of Japanese companies to Mozambique
    - "serving for national economic interests"
  - III. Revision of 2003 ODA Charter
    - to "fit new initiatives in Africa"

# ***Context – Japan’s ODA until 2014***

## **1. Total in 2013:**

- 11,786 million USD
- **Top 4 donor among OECD/DAC countries.**

## **2. to Africa in 2012:**

- 1,718 million USD (1,701 million USD for Grant aid)
- **16% of Total ODA**

## **3. to Mozambique in 2012:**

- 70.3 million USD (55.75 million USD for Grant aid)
- **Top 9 receiver among 49 African countries.**



**Dramatic change is on its way due to:**

**TICAD V (June, 2013) & PM ABE’s visit to Africa (Jan., 2014)**


# *Japan-Mozambique Focus on “Nacala Development Corridor”*

But Why?



1. PM ABE’s visit (Jan. 11-13, 2014)
2. Joint Declaration with President GUEBUZA focusing on “Nacala Development Corridor”
3. PM ABE’s pledge :670 million USD (incl. loan) for “Nacala Development Corridor”
4. **This will make Mozambique one of top recipient countries of Japanese ODA all around the world.**

# What is “Nacala Development Corridor”?



Map by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency)  
It includes **mineral rich provinces: Cabo Delgado and Tete.**

# ***Why “Nacala Development Corridor”?***

## ***- Mining Sector***

- JICA’s Map clearly includes locations and names of mineral resources of Japanese private investment:
  - i. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.: Natural Gas in Cabo Delgado (with ANADARKO)***
  - ii. INPEX Corporation: Natural Gas in CD***
  - iii. Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal: Revuboe Coal Mines in Moatize, Tete***
    - located next to the concession of Brazilian Vale
    - Planning a logistical cooperation with Vale
    - Mitsui participates in the management of Vale since 2003 by increasing its share



# Why “Nacala Development Corridor”? - Agribusiness

- **Itochu Corporation: Agricultural Commodity**
  - i. Itochu leads “**Africa Food Development Research Group**” in which 14 Japanese food companies participate
    - to “produce reliable sources for food supplies (to Japanese market)”
  - ii. This initiative is for “**producing soybean and sesame in Mozambique for the Japanese market**”
  - iii. “**In close cooperation with ProSAVANA**” and JICA
    - (website & JICA’s ProSAVANA High Level Seminar in April, 2013)
  - iv. Utilization of **Brazilian technologies for large-scale commercial soybean production was expected**
    - ( as of March 2013 on TV Tokyo)



Now, Itochu: “**doesn’t want to be associated with ProSAVANA**”.  
And suddenly deleted word “ProSAVANA” from its website.

# Itochu's "CSR Action Paper" in 2013 *before deleted in July 2014*

ProSAVANA

## ■ アフリカ農業支援への取り組み(アフリカ食料開発研究会)

世界規模の人口増加を背景に食料資源の確保が重要となる中、伊藤忠商事は2012年7月、食品加工メーカー14社と「アフリカ食料開発研究会」を発足し、日本政府が推進する、日本、ブラジル、モザンビークの三角協力による農業開発プロジェクト「モザンビーク熱帯サバンナ農業開発(通称:ProSAVANA-JBM)」と連携し、食料資源の安定調達を推進しています。

モザンビーク熱帯サバンナ農業開発は、JICA(独立行政法人国際協力機構)が熱帯農業の先駆者であるブラジルの農業公的機関と協同し、サハラ以南のサバンナ草原の一角を競争力のある農業地帯へと開発することで、同国の貧困問題の解決と日本及び世界の食料資源の安定調達への寄与を目指すプロジェクトです。

「アフリカ食料開発研究会」では、伊藤忠商事が主体となって栄養価が高い大豆や胡麻について、世界トップレベルの研究・開発技術を有する食品メーカーと共に、日本で使用可能な非遺伝子組み換え大豆や品質に厳しい日本人の感覚に合う胡麻の日本市場向け品種の選抜・選定等を通じて、同プロジェクトをサポートしています。2013年秋にはモザンビークで大豆畑の作付けが完了し、育種の予定です。

モザンビークは人口の8割が農業に従事していますが、その9割は小規模農家にとどまっています。農業技術を導入し組織化することで、農家の生活レベルの改善や持続可能な農業モデルの構築に繋がるものと見込まれています。



モザンビークの大豆畑

Soybean Field in  
Mozambique

“80% of Mozambicans are farmers, but remain small-scale.”

# Cont.

- **Nitori, an IKEA-like furniture company:**
  - i. obtained **4,000 ha.** in Malema/Nampula for **cotton production** (*Japanese Embassy Monthly*: July 2013)
  - ii. The company originally **requested 20,000 ha.**
  - iii. **Local authority confirmed that this was a part of ProSAVANA** to local NGO (Oct. 2013)
    - Japanese NGOs' inquiry to JICA in Dec. 2013:
      - **Denial** of linkage with ProSAVANA
    - Yet, the leaked ProSAVANA-PD Report 2 (March 2013) determine Malema (Zone III) for "**Promotion of Cotton Production**" (2-10)
  - iv. The Guardian covered this story (Jan. 2014)
  - v. The latest research revealed that there would be relocation of residents (July 2014)



To Japanese NGO's inquiry (July 2014) :  
**"Nitori doesn't have any projects in Mozambique"**  
Nitori announced postponement of its projects (July 2014)

# ***Why “Nacala Development Corridor”?***


## ***- Infrastructure / Aid industry***

### **1. Rehabilitation of Nacala Corridor-port:**

- Interests of Japanese construction companies, key players of past mega ODA projects

### **2. One of the largest aid projects in recent years:**

- Ever shrinking ODA budget of Japan and survival of aid industry (necessity of shift from Asia/LA to Africa)
- The Largest consortiums of consulting companies** (contract is only for Japanese companies) for Nacala:
  - ProSAVANA-PI; PD: PEM** (2011-2018)
  - Preparation of Economic strategy for Development of the Corridor (**PEDEC-Nacala**) (2013-)



# *Changing nature of Japanese ODA - a return of “traditional approach”*

1. The MoFA’s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) press release:
  - **“The Japanese business circle has strong interests in Nacala Corridor due to undergoing exploitation of natural resources such as coal and its potentiality of agriculture development”** (Oct. 2013).



The objective of “Nacala Development Corridor” :  
Securing much-needed raw materials at home and opening  
exporting route connecting directly to Japan,  
by using Japanese ODA.

2. **Resemblance with past Japanese ODA to Asia,**
  - using ODA as a tool to serve its **“national (economic) interests”**
  - supporting advancement of domestic companies to new “frontier” countries under the name of **“PUBLIC and PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP”**.

# ***New feature of Japanese ODA***

## ***-Emergence of Triangular Cooperation and Alliance with Brazil***

- 1. Japan-Brazil Public & Private Partnership for “Nacala Corridor Development”:**
  - i. Coal mining: Vale
  - ii. Infra-structure:
    - Railway : Vale
    - International Airport: Odebrecht
  - iii. Agribusiness: FGV / Nacala (corridor) Fund, Brazilian producers
  - iv. Aid & Research for Agriculture Development: ABC, EMBRAPA, FGV

**=> This is named “Triangular Cooperation”**
- 2. Choice of Brazil as its ally was due to:**
  - i. Japan’s past engagement with mega development programs in Brazil (PRODECER, Great Carajás, and others)
  - ii. Brazil being a suitable partner to fit Japan’s shortage of human resources with language skills and business experiences in less-developed environment
  - iii. Brazil being a partner of Japan’s diplomacy for UN Reform
  - iv. Compete its rivalry against China**

# ***Challenges and responsibility of Japanese Civil Society for People-driven/centered development***

## **1. No publicly available Information:**

- i. For Mozambican/ local residents, Civil Society (e.g. PEDEC)
- ii. Even for Japanese CSOs, hiding information is daily matter
- iii. Especially info. related to companies are totally disclosed

## **2. Serious lack of academics /CS members in Japan for:**

- i. Monitoring, gathering information, making thorough analysis
- ii. and offering adequate recommendations on issues related to Africa with local civil society to policy makers and private enterprises

## **3. More insiders/ fewer independent academics and citizens :**

- i. Many more practitioners involving with Japanese ODA
- ii. No independent research/critical views on Japanese ODA possible
  - So as some academics who belong to institutions receiving governmental fund (of MoFA and JICA) for their research

## **4. No understanding /fund for civic-advocacy activities in Japan**

- i. No culture of donation, thus inexistence of large national NGOs
- ii. Lack of understanding of importance of policy advocacy in the society



# ***Experience and its Main Outcome*** ***- Pesticide Assistance (2KR/KRII)***

## **1. Japan's Pesticide Assistance (Grant aid):**

- Under “Support of Increase of Food Production” or 2KR/KRII

## **2. 2KR for Mozambique:**

- began in mid-1980s while the country was under war
- consisted predominantly of pesticide
- almost the same amount and types of pesticide every year
- throughout the war until late 1990s

## **3. Obsolete Pesticide everywhere in Africa, esp. in Mozambique**

- Claiming “**responsibility (ownership) of recipient gov.**”
- No checking pesticide after its arrival at ports
- Disappearance /left in storage until they became obsolete
- Obsolete pesticide gathered in Matola to incinerate in 2000

## **4. Civic movement against incineration and Japan's pesticide:**

- Local residents stood against incineration, formed a NGO (*Livaningo*), one of the first environmental NGOs in Moz.
- Contact with Japanese NGO (*JVC*)

# Cont.

## 1. Mozambique-Japan civic advocacy campaign (2000-2004):

- i. A loose coalition of academics, NGOs, citizens formed in Japan and closely worked with Mozambican NGOs:

### ii. Joint activities:

- A) Fact-finding research in Matola and Beira Port
- B) International Seminar at WSSD (Johannesburg Summit 2002)
- C) Visit of a Japanese parliamentarian to Mozambique
- D) Working with International NGOs and UN Agency (FAO)
- E) Media work

### iii. Activities in Mozambique:

- A) Conscious raising among Mozambican Civil Society
- B) Dialogue with governmental organizations (e.g. MICOA)

### iv. Activities in Japan

- A) Information gathering (newly adopted Freedom of Information Act)
- B) Raising public awareness
- C) Periodical information sharing with NGOs, experts and practitioners
- D) Working with parliamentarians of various parties
- E) Holding series of official dialogues between MoFA/JICA and NGOs
- F) Writing evidence-based policy report with suggesting alternatives**
- G) Organizing public discussions with stakeholders based on the report
- H) Dialogue using Informal channel between gov. officials, practitioners and NGO members

# Cont. - Outcome

## 1. The Japanese Government:

- i. admitted its responsibility;
- ii. funded safe **treatment of all the obsolete pesticide** from Japan (lasted 10 years);
- iii. Agreed & promoted **inclusion of Mozambican CSOs and UN in national committees**;
- iv. Changed 2KR's objective & name from "increase production" to "**support deprived farmers**" based on the NGO's policy suggestion in the report;
- v. **Stopped all pesticide assistance under ODA.**

Still one of a few success of policy advocacy in Japanese ODA history.



# *Experience and its Main Outcome*

## *- ProSAVANA*

1. **5 years later (in 2009), ProSAVANA signed for “increasing agriculture production” in Nacala Corridor by transferring technologies from Brazil-Cerrado:**
  - i. None accompanied the above process were in Japanese gov. /JICA side
  - ii. **The learnt lessons were not past institutionally, and forgotten**
  - iii. None to monitor due to dismantlement of the coalition of Japanese CS
  - iv. **Japanese academics and CS not familiar with local criticism on Japan’s agriculture assistance in Cerrado (PRODECER 1970s-90s)**
2. **“Statement on ProSAVANA” by UNAC (National Peasants Union) in Oct. 2012 was a wake-up call for Japanese CS:**
  - i. Again, a loose coalition of academics, NGOs, citizens was formed in Japan and began to work with Mozambican CSOs closely
    - This time, Farmers unions, local CSOs outside Maputo, Brazilian CSOs and International NGOs also became main partners
3. **Approach of Japanese Civil Society:**
  - i. Keeping “**Responsibility and solidarity**” as key attitude
  - ii. **Placing voices** of local farmers and civil society in **center of all actions**
  - iii. Carrying **out advocacy based on evidence** (documents and field works)
  - iv. **Holding periodical dialogues** with MoFA/JICA, Parliamentarians & etc.
  - v. Sharing info. on ProSAVANA and food sovereignty **with wider public**

# Cont. - Outcome

1. Too early to come to conclusions (still on-going process)
  - i. Even today, **rhetoric, inconsistency and contradictions are predominant features of ProSAVANA.**
2. Yet, some positive outcomes can be recognized
3. Shift of official discourse regarding ProSAVANA :
  - i. its objective from “**developing agriculture of the region based on experience of Cerrado**”- **Agribusiness as the main focus**, to “**supporting local small farmers**;
  - ii. no more promoting PRODECER as a successful program to be applied to Mozambique;
  - iii. no more mentioning availability of “**vast land**”, rather emphasizing “**lack of land**”  
(although now it blames on “shifting-farming” of local peasants...);
  - iv. an emphasis of “**dialogue with peasants and civil society**”  
(although still *fait accompli* & only for Master Plan-PD...);
  - v. **less emphasis of export-oriented agriculture**  
(it seems this is changing again...).

Caution! We haven't seen this new discourse in reality yet.

# Cont. – “Os Problemas continuam!”

1. **Still Far from meeting with local concerns:**
  - i. Less democratic/top-down policy formulation
  - ii. Land-grabbing
  - iii. Losing food sovereignty and deterioration of family agriculture
  - iv. Environmental degradation
  - v. Division among farmers
2. **Rather, problematic projects and plans were “taken out” from ProSAVANA in order to avoid accountability issues**
  - i. QIPs, Private Funds, *colonos*, projects related large-scale agriculture
3. **Yet, these original ideas continue to survive and being implemented:**
  - i. “Nacala Corridor Fund” and other individual investment projects
  - ii. Thus, takes people’s rights away from decision making process
4. **This makes ProSAVANA PROCESS even less transparent**
  - i. This kind of “cutting off rotten parts from the main body” without any admittance of mistakes & responsibility and explanations:
    - A) deepens distrust of local society
    - B) promotes disclosure of past documents and information inconsistent/contradictory to new discourse
    - C) causes institutional concealments and lies
    - D) Keeps those involved institutions less open & democratic

# ***Lessons Learnt***

## ***- Why repeating problems ?***

1. **The Japanese gov. agencies (incl. JICA) have tendency:**
  - i. of hiding problems/wrong-doings in public projects/programs
  - ii. of lacking institutional system for accumulation of “lessons”:
    - every 2-3 years staff are transferred to other sections
    - most of aid workers being hired on contract-base
  - iii. of lacking will for handing over “lessons”. It’s “shameful”
  - iv. of preferring “promotion of Good Practices”,
    - Believing they can be reproducible
2. **Japanese CS’s weak basis for continuous monitoring activities:**
  - i. Circle of academics and CSOs are divided along regions (such as Asia, Africa and Latin America)
  - ii. Not enough fund for institutionalize such activities
3. **Lack of independent and critical evaluation of ODA :**
  - i. Academia and practitioners tend to support governmental positions consciously and subconsciously, and be less critical
    - for securing their own interests (jobs and contracts), budgets and institutional relationships (recruitment for their graduates)
    - or, due to established close relationship

# *Lessons Learnt*

## *- How to go beyond ?*

- 1. Unless we learn from past mistakes, the same problems continue as we saw in 2 cases in Mozambique and Brazil**
  - i. Focusing on “Good Practices” without institutionalized system of learning from “Bad Practices” will lead even larger problems
  - ii. Self-praising/promotion can lead culture of hiding & non-transparency
- 2. It's much more costly to make/repeat mistakes, then try to improve them. In many cases, damages cannot be recovered**
  - i. For local communities, vulnerable people, environment, it could be fatal
- 3. Thus, not superficial aspects of KAIZEN, but “Principles of KAIZEN” should be installed in Japanese gov. & its agencies**
- 4. Also, promotion of Independent & evidence-based research not only for narrow academic purpose but serving for people's/social interests is necessary. Such research should:**
  - i. not ignore negative aspects
  - ii. focus on the local stakeholders and local realities
  - iii. bring analysis of power-relations in its evaluation
    - i. Esp. not rely only on official sources and those who receive benefits from projects
    - ii. Cross-check collected information



# *Lessons Learnt*

## *- What is “Principles of KAIZEN”?*

- 1. Admit/recognize mistakes**
- 2. Be thankful when mistakes become visible**
  - i. because earlier mistakes became visible, smaller damage could be
- 3. Put the upmost efforts to find out root causes of these mistakes**
  - i. Finding superficial causes are not enough
    - often harmful for KAIZEN
  - ii. Do not blame on individuals
    - because root causes live within a system as a structure
- 4. Make the upmost commitment to overcome these root causes, but as a system**
- 5. Remember whose interests you are serving for**
  - i. It's recipient of your service= Customers
- 6. Never forget that KAIZEN is an eternal act**
  - i. never think that you have done enough because it will close your eyes to mistakes, and lead future mistakes;

# ***Proposal for acting on advocacy towards the political leaderships***

## **1. Learning and Promoting “Principles of KAIZEN”**

- i. Especially, Japanese gov. and aid agencies (incl. JICA) who promote KAIZEN in the world as their “Good Practice”
- ii. CS and academics should also learn & use them more actively as “national asset”

## **2. Case of ProSAVANA shows how costly it is when a donor does not have opportunities of receiving independent evaluation and of learning from “lessons”**

## **3. Making small changes (“improvements”) after so much efforts of catching world-wide attentions and bringing all kinds of interests groups to Nacala Corridor will not stop already stimulated desire (“greed”) of those**

- i. Damage is not given only on the reputation as a donor/public fund
- ii. Who suffers the most is those at grass root level

## **4. Formulating social system /structure to prevent such incautious and “non-Precautionary” approach from being carried out is indispensable at this turning point**

# Cont.

## - *problems and responsibility of academics*

1. **“Goyo Gakusha”** = gov.-patronized scholars, self-serving academics, scholars who toady up to gov. authorities
  - i. **They are part of established system of hiding problems**
  - ii. **They are within the industry**, receiving benefits by planning, evaluating, publicizing projects/programs.
  - iii. They do research and write reports for already determined result, and only the favorable information and data are collected and listed
2. **For policy change, it is dispensable to take approach opposite to “GOYO GAKUSHA” and challenge them scientifically by:**
  - i. taking scientific and vigorously evidence-base approach
  - ii. analyzing all the available sources (pro- and con-) thoroughly
  - iii. visibly presenting root causes and structural problems
  - iv. always offering evidence of whatever the information sharing in the arguments and discussions

**We waited to learn these until TEPCO's Nuclear Power Plant Reactors explored one by one in Fukushima in 2011**

# *Finally* *- Yet, beyond KAIZEN*

1. **Recognize huge inequality in terms of social and political power, financial and human resources, and information**
  - i. Take this into consideration in planning/preparing for any actions
2. **Act of KAIZEN should be institutionalize. Yet, following points are important in the process:**
  - i. Start with mutual respect and trust for securing the process, and such process will strengthen mutual respect and trust
  - ii. Three-steps are required: **“sharing” => “understanding” => “sympathy” based on equality and fairness.**
    - A) “Sharing” is the start/the precondition and most important
    - B) Without sharing, no one will understand, thus projects will fail.
    - C) If the process reaches the stage of attracting sympathy of stakeholders, the outcome should meet the goal of the project.
  - iii. The key to it is dialogue, but without the above process of sharing, understanding and sympathy, it is not dialogue.