Viewing cable 09BAMAKO104, A SPOONFUL OF CHINESE SUGAR SOURS U.S. INVESTORS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
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09BAMAKO104 | 2009-02-23 11:20 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bamako |

VZCZCXRO9727 RR RUEHPA DE RUEHBP #0104/01 0541120 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 231120Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0043 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0015 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0486 RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000104 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AID/AFR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: ECON EIND ETRD EINT EAGR ML SUBJECT: A SPOONFUL OF CHINESE SUGAR SOURS U.S. INVESTORS IN MALI REF: BAMAKO 00051 Classified By: Economic Officer Manoela Borges, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d). 1.(C) Summary: During a February 2 meeting with the Embassy, representatives of the Schaffer Global Group, a U.S. based project development firm, enumerated repeated failings by the Malian government to honor an investment agreement with Schaffer and its South African technical partner, Ilovo, to establish a sugar cane plantation and refinery near the Malian town of Markala. Since the project's inception in 1999, Schaffer has received nearly USD 2 million in USG funding from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) and USAID. In an attempt to undermine the Schaffer consortium's investment, a preexisting Chinese-owned sugar refinery in Markala has pressured the Malian government to renege on official agreements with Schaffer and reallocate prime sugar cane land already ceded to Schaffer to the Chinese sugar refinery for its own alleged expansion plans. Schaffer representatives insisted that no such expansion was planned and that this was purely an attempt by the Chinese company to retain its monopoly over Mali's sugar market. Schaffer representatives warned that Ilovo would pull out of the project if the issue is not settled within the next few weeks, effectively killing the project. We have, in conjunction with the South African Embassy, frequently raised concerns with senior most Malian government officials over the various delays that have prevented Schaffer's sugar project from moving forward. We will continue to demarche senior Malian officials over the need to live up to official commitments to foreign investors. However, with Ilovo's deadline rapidly approaching, we fear that Mali may choose the easiest way out: running out the clock on ten years and several million dollars worth of investment by both Schaffer and the USG. End Summary. -------------------------------- The Schaffer-Ilovo Sugar Project -------------------------------- 2.(U) In 1999 the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) funded a feasibility study for a sugar refinery project at the request of the Malian Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Transport. USTDA provided the Louisiana-based Schaffer and Associates with USD 250,000 and the Malian government USD 200,000 to conduct this study. After Schaffer completed the study in 2001, Schaffer was selected as a consultant by the Malian government to seek funding for the implementation of the project to be located in Markala just north of the town of Segou. In 2003, USAID contributed USD 892,000 and Schaffer USD 600,000 to undertake sugar cane variety trials. For these trials, Mali contributed a 74 hectare (ha) plot of land in the Office du Niger, which is the agricultural management and irrigation authority for Mali's main rice growing zone. USAID contributed another USD 500,000 in 2005 to complete initial field trials, analyze irrigation practices and potential sugar cane varieties. 3.(U) Schaffer subsequently secured a technical partner, the South African company Ilovo, which is a subsidiary of British Amalgamated Foods, and created, in 2003, the Malian company Societe Sucriere de Markala (SOSUMAR). SOSUMAR is 70 percent owned by Ilovo, 22 percent by private Malian investors, and 4 percent each by Schaffer and the Malian government. The refinery project was envisaged in two stages. During the first 10 year phase of the project, SOSUMAR would produce 200,000 metric tons of pure plantation white sugar per year over 15,000 ha at a cost of roughly USD 400 million. This sugar would meet international standards and could be exported to other markets in west Africa. Production would double during the second phase, to 400,000 metric tons per year, creating an economy of a scale large enough as to satisfy the domestic market and transform Mali into a sugar exporter. The project is expected to create about 7,000 full-time jobs and more than 3,000 seasonal jobs. Schaffer and Ilovo are now in the process of creating a second company, CaneCo, to manage the actual cultivation of sugar cane. CaneCo will be 90 percent owned by the Malian government and 10 percent owned by SOSUMAR. 4.(U) Funding for the projects' privately financed industrial component, valued at USD 200 million, is significantly committed and awaiting loan institutions, including the African Development Bank (ADB), Kuwaiti Funds, the Islamic Development Bank, OPEC, the West African Development Bank (BOAD) and others pledging to cover the long term loans for BAMAKO 00000104 002 OF 003 sugar cane operations. Schaffer and Ilovo are working with Mali and the ADB - mandated by the Malian government as the project's lead lender - to secure USD 200 million in funding for the project's agricultural component. -------------------------- Chinese Sugar Not So Sweet -------------------------- 5.(U) The Schaffer sugar project's proximity to a Chinese owned sugar refinery, SUKALA, has been a challenge from the start. As Mali's only domestic sugar producer and refiner, SUKALA has enjoyed unrivaled market share in Mali since it started operations in 1968. Originally wholly owned by the Malian government, in 1996 Mali decided to part of its Chinese debt accumulated during the factory's construction for SUKALA shares. As a result, China acquired a 60 percent share of SUKALA, leaving 40 percent for the Malian government. Over 40 years, SUKALA has yielded approximately USD 10 million in profits. Since SUKALA produces poorly refined sugar that does not meet international standards and is not particularly well liked by Malian consumers, preferential import treatment by the Malian government has helped SUKALA stay afloat. Currently, for every one part SUKALA sugar purchased, an importer may import from abroad up to three times that amount in pure white sugar duty-free. 6.(U) These import regulations and SUKALA's status as the only sugar refinery in Mali means that the Chinese company has a guaranteed market for its product and is anxious about losing this profitable arrangement should SOSUMAR's operations get underway. Chinese attempts to "compensate" for SOSUMAR's envisioned activities have forced Schaffer and Ilovo to seriously alter their business plan at several points during the design phase. ------------------------ Schaffer Takes its Lumps ------------------------ 7.(C) SUKALA has repeatedly pressured the Malian government to revisit its land agreement with Schaffer, hoping that Mali will reallocate SOSUMAR land back to SUKALA. Such a move would effectively torpedo the project as current production models require all of the land already allocated. In late 2008 Schaffer informed the Embassy that Mali's newly named Minister of Economy, Industry and Commerce, Ahmadou Abdoulaye Diallo, had informed Schaffer of his intention to do exactly this by reallocating hectares already officially given SOSUMAR back to SUKALA. A few days later, however, Minister Diallo reversed this decision, claiming that he had not been aware that the Malian government had already officially given the land in question to Schaffer. It now appears that Minister Diallo has reversed his reversal. 8.(C) During a February 2 meeting with the Ambassador, Schaffer Global Group CEO Geralyn Contini, Schaffer Global Group Managing Director Mima Nedelcovych, and other representatives described the latest hurdles they have encountered. Schaffer officials enumerated repeated failings by the Malian government to honor an investment agreement with Schaffer and its South African technical partner, Ilovo. Schaffer representatives said SOSUMAR's operations have been effectively stymied by efforts by the adjacent Chinese refinery SUKALA to persuade Malian officials to revisit already settled land allocations. Under the pretense of planning its own expansion, SUKALA has pressured the Minister of Economy to allocate a 35,000 ha tract of land, known as Zone A, to SUKALA. Schaffer representatives insisted the Chinese had no such expansion planned and were simply interested in sabotaging the SOSUMAR operation so as not to lose its dominance over Mali's sugar market. Schaffer CEO Contini said this was a common tactic employed by Chinese companies in Africa and that she had witnessed similar maneuverings by Chinese operations in other East and West African markets. The Schaffer representatives described Chinese importers in Mali as a "mafia", since the producers, importers, and distributors are an insular group of three to four Chinese businessmen. 9.(C) In an attempt to allay Chinese fears that the SOSUMAR refinery would herald the end of Chinese operations, SOSUMAR had previously drafted a market sharing agreement that would guarantee a quota on the local market proportional to production. Any excess production would be traded either in foreign markets or through an exchange in Mali. This would effectively guarantee a market for all Chinese sugar BAMAKO 00000104 003 OF 003 production. SUKALA would still be affected, however, as the introduction of plentiful, high quality sugar produced by SOSUMAR would naturally drive prices down. Schaffer said they were told during meetings with the Minister of Economy that SUKALA had rejected numerous offers for alternative tracts of land. The Minister also intimated he was under pressure from Prime Minister Sidibe to support a "two-project plan" but that, if it came to it, his own preference was to lose SUKALA rather than SOSUMAR. According to Schaffer's local representative and SOSUMAR Director Harouna Niang, during a January meeting with Schaffer the Minister of Economy went through several iterations of land allocation to try to please both SOSUMAR and SUKALA. The Minister promised Niang he would present the proposal designed during this most recent meeting for the Prime Minister's approval and attempt to defend it as the Malian government's best option. -------------------- Electricity Problems -------------------- 10.(U) Schaffer Global Group Managing Director Nedelcovych stated that the land allocation issue obscured other fundamental problems in getting SOSUMAR's operations off the ground. Principally, the questions of electricity and water supply were still unresolved. Mali's electricity company, Energy of Mali (EDM), currently has a 15 kilo Volt (kV) line from Alatona, which would be used to power SOSUMAR's operations. But SOSUMAR's needs are 33kV. Ilovo would make the up-front USD 2 million investment necessary to increase power supply with reimbursement from the GOM. However, an agreement with the GOM regarding whether this would be denominated in USD or CFA has not been reached; the GOM wants the investment denominated in CFA and Ilovo does not want to assume the foreign exchange risk. --------------------------------------------- ----------- Comment: Chinese Influence Trumps U.S. Investors, Again --------------------------------------------- ----------- 11.(C) Unfortunately, Schaffer's experience is part of a broader pattern of Chinese influence over the GOM in cases where Chinese investment interests are threatened (Reftel). On its own, this influence represents a considerable deterrent to foreign investment in Mali. Schaffer representatives told the Embassy that their primary financial partner, Ilovo, was on the brink of pulling out of the project if a solution could not be reached by the end of February. Such a decision by Ilovo would effectively kill the Schaffer sugar project ten years after it was initiated. 12.(C) Over the past four years we have, on Schaffer's behalf, frequently raised concerns about various impediments to the sugar project with many senior Malian officials. This includes President Amadou Toumani Toure, Prime Minister Modibo Sidibe, Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane, former Minister of Finance and Economy Abu-Bakar Traore, and former Minister of Commerce, Trade and Investment Ousmane Thiam. Many of these demarches were delivered jointly in conjunction with the South African Ambassador to Mali. We will continue to press the Malian government to both honor its commitments to Schaffer and consider the ramifications for foreign investors should the Schaffer project fall through. Unfortunately, the Malian government is not known for either swift or decisive action and Mali could regard an end of February deadline as a opportunity to simply run out the clock on Schaffer. Chinese President Hu Jintao's Feb 12-13 visit to Mali to inaugurate Bamako's third bridge over the Niger - billed as the largest Chinese development project in west Africa - will likely not accelerate the Malian government's interest in clarifying Schaffer's land dilemma. MILOVANOVIC